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Abstract
The global trade in wildlife has historically contributed to the emergence and spread of infectious diseases. The United
States is the world’s largest importer of wildlife and wildlife products, yet minimal pathogen surveillance has precluded
assessment of the health risks posed by this practice. This report details the findings of a pilot project to establish
surveillance methodology for zoonotic agents in confiscated wildlife products. Initial findings from samples collected at
several international airports identified parts originating from nonhuman primate (NHP) and rodent species, including
baboon, chimpanzee, mangabey, guenon, green monkey, cane rat and rat. Pathogen screening identified retroviruses
(simian foamy virus) and/or herpesviruses (cytomegalovirus and lymphocryptovirus) in the NHP samples. These results are
the first demonstration that illegal bushmeat importation into the United States could act as a conduit for pathogen spread,
and suggest that implementation of disease surveillance of the wildlife trade will help facilitate prevention of disease
emergence.
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Introduction
No adequate estimate of numbers of wildlife traded throughout
the world exists given the large size and covert nature of the
business. Beyond the threats to conservation, the intermingling of
wildlife, domestic animals and humans during the process of
wildlife extraction, consumption, and trade can serve as a vessel
for pathogen exchange [1]. Nearly 75% of emerging infectious
diseases in humans are of zoonotic origin, the majority of which
originate in wildlife [2,3]. Therefore infectious diseases acquired
from contact with wildlife, such as occurs via the wildlife trade, are
increasingly of concern to global public health.
Trade in live animals and animal products has led to the
emergence of several zoonotic pathogens, of which RNA viruses
are the most common. SARS emerged as a respiratory and
gastrointestinal disease in southwest China and within months had
spread to 29 other countries, eventually leading to 8,098 cases and
774 deaths. Masked palm civets (Paguma larvata) traded in the
markets of Guangdong were found to be infected and a large
proportion of the early cases were restaurant workers who bought
and butchered wildlife from these markets [4].
The United States is one of the world’s largest consumers of
imported wildlife and wildlife products [5]. Between 2000 and
2006, approximately 1.5 billion live wild animals (around
120,000,000 per year) were legally imported into the United
States nearly 90% of which were destined for the pet industry [6],
and an average of over 25 million kilograms of non-live wildlife
enter the United States each year [5]. New York is the most
frequently used port of entry into the United States, and in
combination with Los Angeles and Miami accounts for more than
half of all known wildlife imports. Imports most often refused
entry (i.e., deemed to be illegal) into the United States included
those from China, Philippines, Hong Kong, Thailand, and
Nigeria [5] – countries with endemic pathogens such as highly
pathogenic H5N1 influenza virus, Nipah virus, and simian
retroviruses.
Health risks to the US public, agricultural industry, and native
wildlife posed by the wildlife trade have generally not been
quantified due to minimal surveillance of live animal imports and
the absence of surveillance of wildlife product imports. Despite
this, known examples of disease introductions to the United
States via the wildlife trade have included pathogens of risk to
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diomycosis, exotic Newcastle’s disease, and monkeypox, respec-
tively. The monkeypox outbreak showed that a single shipment of
infected animals can result in serious impact on public health,
highlighting the challenges faced by agencies attempting to
regulate both legal and illegal wildlife trade. The USDA regulates
certain exotic ruminant species, some birds, some fish, a few
species of tortoise, hedgehogs, tenrecs, and brushtail possums for
specific foreign animal diseases to protect agricultural health. In
general, there is no current remit for USDA to regulate species as
potential threats to wildlife or public health. Species restricted by
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) include
certain turtles, NHPs, bats, civets, and African rodents.
Hunting and butchering of bushmeat (for the purpose of this
paper to be defined according to Oxford Dictionary as the meat of
African wild animals) has been increasingly recognized as a source
of disease emergence. Harvest of NHP bushmeat and exposure to
NHPs in captivity have resulted in cross-species transmission of
several retroviruses to humans including simian immunodeficiency
virus (SIV), simian T-lymphotropic virus (STLV), and simian
foamy virus (SFV) [7,8]. While SIV and STLV adapted to humans
and spread to become the global pathogens human immunode-
ficiency virus (HIV) and human T-lymphotropic virus (HTLV),
less is known about the distribution and public health con-
sequences of SFV infection [7]. Much of the bushmeat smuggled
into the United States from Africa by air passes through Europe en
route, although amount and characteristics of bushmeat reaching
US borders is not well described. One study estimated that
273 tons of bushmeat was imported every year into Paris Roissy-
Charles de Gaulle Airport in France on Air France carriers alone
[9].
Under the authority of the Public Health Service Act, the US
Department of Health and Human Service (DHHS), CDC is
responsible for preventing the introduction, transmission, and
spread of communicable diseases, including those from animals or
animal products to humans. CDC recognizes the potential public
health risk posed by illegal trade in wildlife and regulations are in
place that prohibit the importation of bushmeat products derived
from CDC-regulated animals. To better understand and educate
the public about risks to public health from smuggled bushmeat,
beginning in 2008 CDC and inter-agency and non-governmental
partners initiated a cooperative effort to assess those risks. This
effort includes a pilot study to screen for evidence of zoonotic
pathogens in CDC-regulated wild animal products. Here we
report finding sequences of simian retroviruses and herpesviruses
in bushmeat confiscated at five US airports.
Methods
Shipment confiscation and specimen collection
This pilot study was initiated at John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK)
in Queens, NY, where CDC-regulated wildlife products were
seized by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) between
October 2008 to September 2010. Beginning in April 2010,
additional seizures from another four airports that receive
international flights (Philadelphia, Washington Dulles, George
Bush Intercontinental-Houston, and Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson
International) were included in the study. Illegally imported
shipments were confiscated opportunistically and thus the pilot
study established only the presence and not the prevalence of
zoonotic agents in the specimens.
Site of origin and destination, flight data, mail shipment or
carrying passenger identification, date of arrival, and date of
sample collection were recorded for each confiscation. Items were
photographed and identified to genus and species if possible.
Biological samples were processed for aliquoting and storage at the
CDC Quarantine Laboratory at JFK Airport, and any remaining
tissues were incinerated according to standard protocols. All items
were sampled while wearing full personal protective equipment
and sterile instruments were used to avoid cross-contamination.
The freshest part of each item was located (muscle appearing red
or raw, joint fluid, bone marrow, etc.) and several samples were
taken from each item, placed in cryotubes, and preserved
immediately in liquid nitrogen.
An additional collection of bushmeat items was seized by US
Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) at JFK airport in 2006, and
provided for this study by USFWS and the United States
Geological Survey National Wildlife Health Center (NWHC).
Specimens included those central to a 2006 federal case against a
person caught smuggling bushmeat into New York for resale [10].
These samples had been stored at USFWS forensic laboratories at
220uC from 2006 until 2010, when they were shipped to the
NWHC for processing as part of this study. All specimens were
then stored at 280uC, and thawed at 220uC before processing at
the NWHC. Tissue dissection was performed as described above
with some minor differences; 0.5 cm
2 samples were preserved in
1 mL Nuclisens lysis buffer (Biomerieux Inc, cat# 284135) prior to
immediate storage at 280uC.
Sample analysis and preparation
Permission was obtained from the New York Department of
Agriculture and Markets to transfer the frozen specimens from
JFK Airport to CDC National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral
Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (NCHHSTP), and/or
Columbia University’s Center for Infection and Immunity (CII)
for testing. When an assured gross identification of species could
not be made, samples were genetically identified by phylogenetic
analysis of mtDNA genes, including cytochrome c oxidase subunits
I and II (COX1/2), and/or cytochrome b (CytB) [11–15].
Nucleic acids were extracted from 10–30 mg of tissue using
mechanical disruption (Qiagen tissue lyser II or Next Advance Inc
Bullet Blender), followed by proteinase K treatment until complete
digestion of the tissue was achieved. Purification of subsequent
homogenates was performed using the Qiagen All-Prep DNA and
RNA extraction kit or DNeasy Blood and Tissue kits according to
the manufacturer’s instructions. Nucleic acid quality was deter-
mined using the Agilent BioAnalyser (Agilent RNA nano 6000) or
ß-actin PCR as previously described [16].
Microbial Screening
Samples were screened for multiple pathogens as described in
detail elsewhere, including: leptospira and anthrax [17], herpes-
viruses [18], filoviruses [19], paramyxoviruses [20], coronaviruses
[21], flaviviruses [22], orthopoxviruses [23] and simian retro-
viruses (SIV, STLV, SFV) [24–29]. All PCR-amplified bands
approximately the expected size were confirmed by sequencing.
Sequence Analysis
Raw sequences were analyzed and edited in Geneious Pro
v5.1.7 and MEGA 5.03. Multiple sequence alignments were
constructed using ClustalW and phylogenetic comparisons made
using Neighbor-Joining (NJ) and maximum likelihood (ML)
algorithms. ModelTest was used to select the most appropriate
nucleotide substitution model. Support for branching order was
evaluated using 1,000 nonparametric bootstrap support. Sequence
identity was calculated using uncorrected p-distances in PAUP*
and BLAST.
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Specimen condition and species composition
From October 2008 to September 2010, 8 postal shipments
confiscated at JFK Airport were included in this study. From June
2010 to September 2010, an additional 20 passenger-carried
packages confiscated at the four other international airports were
sampled for this study. Additional confiscations were made but
were not included in this study due to poor condition of sample
(e.g., severely degraded or chemically treated). In many cases
multiple separate packages were included in a single shipment or
carried by a single passenger. Specimens varied in condition,
including items that were fresh, raw transported in a cooler, lightly
smoked, or well dried (Fig. 1A–D). Most items contained moist
inner tissue. RNA quality was low with a predominance of
degraded, low molecular weight fragments in the samples, while B-
actin sequences were detected in the NHP specimens suggesting
the presence of amplifiable DNA (data not shown). Samples from
approximately 44 animals were included in this study, including 9
NHPs comprising 2 chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), 2 mangabeys
(Cercocebus spp.), and 5 guenons (Cercopithecus spp.; one of which was
further analyzed and identified as Cercopithecus nictitans, white-nosed
guenon) all confirmed by phylogenetic analysis; and 35 rodents
comprised of 14 cane rats (Thryonomys sp.) confirmed by gross or
phylogenetic analysis, 18 suspected cane rats (based on gross
identification), and 3 rats (unknown species) confirmed by gross
identification.
The USFWS specimens from 2006 included an additional 20
NHP tissues from 16 individual animals including 10 baboons
(Papio sp.) and 6 African green monkeys (AGMs; Chlorocebus sp.) all
confirmed by phylogenetic analysis.
Pathogen detection
Both SFV and herpesviruses were detected in the nonhuman
primate bushmeat samples. All positive NHP samples are
presented in Table 1. All NHP samples were negative for SIV
and STLV sequences. All rodent samples were negative for
leptospira, anthrax, herpesviruses, filoviruses, paramyxoviruses,
coronaviruses, flaviviruses, and orthopoxviruses.
Simian Foamy Virus
SFV polymerase (pol, 465-bp) and long terminal repeat (LTR,
,357-bp) sequences were detected at CDC in tissues from one
chimpanzee (BM013) and one mangabey (BM008). SFV LTR
sequences were also identified in a second mangabey (BM010).
BLAST analysis of the 425-bp pol sequences from BM013 and
BM008 showed maximum nucleotide identity to SFVs from P. t
ellioti and mangabey (Cercocebus atys and Cercocebus agilis), respec-
tively. Phylogenetic analysis of the two pol sequences with those
Figure 1. Nonhuman primate bushmeat specimens confiscated at US airports. Examples of smuggled simian bushmeat (a) skull, (b) hand,
(c) skull and torso, and (d) arm. Ruler units are centimeters.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029505.g001
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highly related to SFV from P. t. ellioti whereas the mangabey SFV
clustered tightly with SFV from sooty mangabeys (Cercocebus atys)
(Figure 2). P. t. ellioti are endemic to West-Central Africa in Nigeria
and Cameroon while Cercocebus atys are found in West Africa from
Senegal to Ghana. Phylogenetic analysis was not performed on
LTR sequences since only limited SFV sequences in this region are
available at GenBank. BLAST analysis was similarly limited and
gave the highest nucleotide identity to chimpanzee and mandrill
(M. sphinx) SFV LTR sequences, respectively. The two LTR
sequences from mangabeys (BM008 and BM010) were 94%
identical to each other due to an 8-bp deletion in the LTR of
BM008 and 8 nucleotide substitutions.
In the USFWS samples SFV pol sequences were present in 3/10
baboons, and in 1/6 AGMs. The baboon SFVs shared .97%
nucleotide identity, and had 88–90% nucleotide identity with the
AGM SFV. Phylogenetic analysis of the short (156 bp) pol
sequences shows that the three baboon SFVs clustered together,
yet separately from the AGM SFV - suggesting some genetic
relatedness that reflects host specificity as previously demonstrated
[13] (Figure 3). However, while the short baboon SFV pol
sequences detected in this study clustered together, they did not
cluster with other published sequences from baboons (80.1–84.2%
nucleotide identity). Similarly the AGM sequences did not cluster
with published AGM sequences (85.8–86.5% nucleotide identity).
These results may reflect poor phylogenetic signal from limited
sequence data in this region.
All simian DNA samples from USFWS were also screened for
larger SFV pol sequences (465-bp) as done at the CDC but were
found in only one baboon sample (CII-163). Phylogenetic analysis
of the larger pol sequence inferred a significant relationship to SFV
from Guinea baboons (P. papio) (Figure 3), which correlated with
the origin of the shipment (Guinea). Our inability to detect larger
pol sequences in other SFV-positive baboon and AGM samples
may be due to highly degraded nucleic acids in those specimens
(confiscated in 2006) which limits detection of longer sequences.
Herpesviruses
Two genera of herpesvirus were detected in NHP specimens,
including cytomegaloviruses (CMV; betaherpesvirus) and lympho-
cryptoviruses (LCV; gammaherpesvirus) (Table 1). CMV se-
quences from baboons CII-028 and CII-163 shared .99.5%
nucleotide identity indicating they are likely to be the same virus.
Comparison of this virus with the CMV sequence from white-
nosed guenon BM002 showed these two CMVs are 91% identical.
Overall, nucleotide sequence identity within the CMVs (for
sequences included here) was shown to be 68.4–100% (m=85.0%).
LCVs were detected in four AGMs, two baboons, and one
mangabey. LCV sequences in AGMs CII-044 and CII-144 were
.99% identical and likely represent the same virus. A comparison
of this virus with the other LCVs detected showed 88.2–95.5%
sequence identity. Sequence identity for the entire LCV group was
calculated to be 81.0–100% (m=87.5).
Phylogenetic analysis confirmed the presence and phylogenetic
relatedness of CMV and LCV in these NHP specimens (Figure 4).
Mixed infections
Multiple viruses were detected within some samples. Both LCV
and SFV were detected in the bone marrow of AGM CII-051 and
muscle of mangabey BM008 (Table 1). CMV, LCV, and SFV
were detected in baboon CII-163 (Table 1).
GenBank Accession numbers
New SFV, herpesvirus, and mtDNA sequences identified in the
current study have been deposited at GenBank with the following
accession numbers: JF810903–JF810914 and JF828317–
JF828329. Sequences less than 200 bp are available upon request.
Discussion
Our study is the first to establish surveillance for zoonotic
viruses in wild animal products illegally imported into the United
States in an effort to prevent the transmission of infectious agents
Table 1. Species identification and viruses found in smuggled nonhuman primate bushmeat samples
1.
Species
2 Common name
Sample
number
1 Tissue LCV CMV SFV
Origin of
package
Destination of
package
Chlorocebus sabaeus green monkey CII-040 Bone marrow + Guinea Staten Island, NY
Chlorocebus sabaeus green monkey CII-051 Bone marrow ++ Guinea Staten Island, NY
Chlorocebus sabaeus green monkey CII-044 Trachea + Guinea Staten Island, NY
Chlorocebus sabaeus green monkey CII-144 Trachea + Guinea Staten Island, NY
Cercopithecus nictitans greater white-nosed monkey BM002 Muscle + Nigeria Dallas, TX
Papio papio baboon CII-013 Bone marrow + Guinea Staten Island, NY
Papio papio baboon CII-028 Spinal nerve + Guinea Staten Island, NY
Muscle +
Papio papio baboon CII-046 Right eye + Guinea Staten Island, NY
Papio papio baboon CII-163 Optic nerve ++Guinea Staten Island, NY
Right eye ++
Trachea ++
Cercocebus atys sooty mangabey BM008 Muscle ++ Liberia Philadelphia, PA
Cercocebus atys sooty mangabey BM010 Muscle + Liberia Philadelphia, PA
Pan troglodytes ellioti Nigeria-Cameroon chimpanzee BM013 Muscle + Nigeria Queens, NY
1Only samples testing positive are listed. All other rodent and simian samples were negative for all pathogens tested.
2Species identification inferred with phylogenetic analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029505.t001
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in this study were tested for a limited range of pathogens only and
thus presence of additional pathogens not included in this study
cannot be ruled out. We identified four SFV strains and two
different herpesviruses (in some cases in the same tissues) in
smuggled NHP bushmeat. Using phylogenetic analysis and gross
examination, we were able to determine that bushmeat from nine
NHP species and at least two rodent species were attempted to be
smuggled into the United States. These results are consistent with
the origin of the shipments from West Africa and included species
of conservation importance (P. papio, Cercocebus atys, and P. t. ellioti
are classified as ‘‘near threatened’’, ‘‘vulnerable’’, and ‘‘endan-
gered’’, respectively by the International Union for Conservation
of Nature), suggesting more education efforts or harsher penalties
are needed regarding the handling, consumption, and illegal
transportation of products from wildlife of conservation concern.
In addition, the finding of mangabey, guenon, and cane rat
bushmeat in our study is consistent with that reported by Chaber et
al who found these and bushmeat from nine other species entering
Paris-Charles de Gaulle Airport [9].
Our finding of SFV DNA in smuggled NHP specimens
comprising of four species (baboon, chimp, mangabey, and
Figure 2. Inferred phylogenetic relationships of SFV pol sequences detected in bushmeat samples. Neighbor-joining (NJ) and maximum-
likelihood (ML) analysis gave identical branching orders. New SFV sequences identified in this study are boxed. Clades of sequences from Mandrillus,
Cercopithicus, Chlorocebus, Macaca, Pongo, Gorilla, and Pan paniscus are collapsed for presentation. Branch lengths are drawn to scale and only
bootstrap values (NJ/ML) greater than 70% are shown.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029505.g002
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humans exposed to NHPs. However, the mode of transmission to
humans is poorly understood and while most infected people
reported sustaining a NHP exposure (mostly bites) others did not,
suggesting a less invasive mode of infection is possible [7]. These
viruses are probably not easily spread from human-to-human,
although persistent infection has been documented [7]. Several
SFV-positive people reported donating blood while infected and
because blood banks do not screen for SFV, secondary
transmission via contaminated blood donations may be possible
[7]. Further research into the possibility of secondary transmis-
sion of SFV is required. The finding of SFV DNA in the
bushmeat samples highlights a potential public health risk of
exposure to these tissues along the hunting, transportation, and
consumption continuum with multiple opportunities for primary
transmissions. Unlike most retroviruses whose RNA genome is
packaged in the viral particles, foamy viruses are unusual in that
DNA and/or RNA can be present in the infectious virus
particles. Thus, finding of only DNA does not exclude that SFV
in these tissues is not infectious, especially in the more recently
CDC confiscated items which contained fresher tissue compared
to the USFWS items confiscated in 2006 that were partially
degraded at the time of analysis in 2010. Human infection with
SFV is of further concern because increases in the pathogenicity
of simian retroviruses following cross-species transmission have
been documented (e.g., HIV-1 and HIV-2) [30,31]. However, the
limited number of cases, short follow-up duration, and selection
biases in the enrolling of healthy workers or hunters to identify
cases all limit the identification of potential disease associations
[7].
Although we did not find SIV or STLV in the limited number
of specimens in this study, these viruses have been found in high
prevalences in NHP specimens at bushmeat markets and in
hunted NHPs [8,32,33]. HIV-1 and HIV-2 emerged as a result of
several spillover events of SIV from chimpanzees and mangabeys,
respectively, that were likely hunted for bushmeat in central and
western Africa [30]. Serosurveillance studies have shown thirty-
five different species of African NHPs harbor lentivirus infections,
Figure 3. Inferred phylogenetic relationships of SFV pol (,153 bp) sequences detected in USFWS bushmeat samples. Neighbor-
joining (NJ) and maximum-likelihood (ML) analysis gave identical branching orders. New SFV sequences identified in this study are underlined.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029505.g003
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chimpanzees, and 30–60% of free-ranging sooty mangabeys and
green monkeys [30,31,33,34].
To date, four groups of HTLV viruses found in humans are
believed to have originated from corresponding STLV strains in
NHP species (including mangabeys, baboons, and chimpanzees)
via multiple transmission events [35]. HTLV-1, closely related to
STLV-1 group viruses, infects 15 to 20 million people worldwide
and is spread from person to person via bodily fluids [35]. These
viruses are capable of causing leukemia, lymphoma and neurologic
disease in humans [35]. Discoveries of HTLV-3 and HTLV-4,
and a novel STLV-1 strain were recently made in NHP hunters in
Cameroon [7], and 89% of hunted bushmeat in Cameroon has
been shown to be infected with STLV strains [8,32]. Although
imported wildlife products are often not in a freshly-killed state,
many are not smoked or processed in any manner, thus screening
of larger sample collections of smuggled bushmeat may reveal
evidence of these viruses.
Like retroviruses, herpesviruses can cause long-term latent
infections in their host. Most herpesviruses are host-specific, yet
particular strains are capable of causing severe disease in the non-
host, examples of which include agents of malignant catarrhal
fever and Herpes B virus [36,37]. CMVs are in the betaherpes-
virus subfamily. Human CMV is typically asymptomatic in
humans, with the exception of immunocompromised persons.
Similarly, many NHPs are asymptomatic hosts of CMV that do
not typically infect other species, including humans. However,
baboon CMV (bCMV), like that identified in our study, has been
shown to replicate in human tissues in vitro as well as infect and
replicate in humans following a bCMV-positive liver xenotrans-
plant [38].
Lymphocryptoviruses (LCV) are in the gammaherpesvirus
subfamily, and include human LCV, and Epstein-Barr virus
(EBV), the agent of infectious mononucleosis. Nearly 90% of
adults in the United States have antibodies indicating exposure at
some point to EBV. LCVs are typically asymptomatic in their
Figure 4. Inferred phylogenetic relationships of herpesviruses detected in siman bushmeat samples. Neighbor-joining (NJ) and
maximum-likelihood (ML) analysis gave identical branching orders. Sequences identified in bushmeat products are underlined and cluster with sub-
families betaherpesvirus (samples: CII-028, CII-163, BM-002), and gammaherpesvirus (samples: CII-163, CII-013, CII-051, CII-044, CII-144, CII-040, BM-008).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029505.g004
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may develop B-cell tumors. Although much less efficient, baboon
LCV can infect human B cells in immunocompromised persons or
in persons co-infected with EBV and replicate in EBV-immorta-
lized B cells with the theoretical potential for viral recombination
[39]. However, it is unknown if the novel herpesviruses found in
bushmeat specimens in our study can easily infect humans
handling these tissues. Systematic studies examining herpesvirus
transmission risks associated with handling or consumption of
infected animal tissues have not been reported. In addition, virus
isolation was not performed in our study to determine the
infectiousness of the specimens at the time of confiscation.
In summary, our study establishes initial surveillance methodol-
ogy to detect and identify zoonotic pathogens and species of origin
of wildlife products entering the United States. While we were
successful in demonstrating the presence of SFV and herpesviruses
in bushmeat specimens, our pilot study was limited by the range,
number, and variable condition of products available to us and
was not intended to be a comprehensive review of presence or to
measure prevalence of all pathogens imported in wildlife products.
Because our study only included a small number of CDC-
regulated species and excluded products of ungulate, carnivore,
reptile, avian and other origin, as well as any live animal imports,
all of which may carry zoonotic pathogens or diseases that
threaten domestic livestock or native wildlife, in addition to the
fact that virus isolation was not performed in our study to
determine the infectiousness of the specimens at the time of
confiscation, there is a large component of zoonotic disease risk
assessment not included in this study. A further understanding of
pathogen movements through the trade will only be recognized
through broader surveillance efforts and pathogen identification
and discovery techniques in wildlife and wildlife products arriving
at US ports of entry so that appropriate measures can be taken to
further mitigate potential risks.
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